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Abbreviations 
Acronym Description 
ASEP Accident Sequence Evaluation Program 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 
CBDT Cause Based Decision Tree 
CDF Core Damage Frequency 
EDG Emergency Diesel Generator 
EOP Emergency Operating Procedure 
ERO Emergency Response Organization 
FTR Fail To Run 
HCR Human Cognitive Reliability 
HEP Human Error Probability 
HFE Human Failure Event 
HPLV Human Performance Limiting Value 
HRA Human Reliability Analysis 
HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 
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LERF Large Early Release Frequency 
LOCA Loss Of Coolant Accident 
LPSD Low Power and ShutDown 
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ORE Operator Reliability Experiments 
POS Plant Operating State 
RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
PROSAFE PROlonged available time and SAFE states 
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PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
PSF Performance Shaping Factor 
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RCS Reactor Coolant System 
SSC Systems, Structures and Components 
SSES Safe and Stable End State 
THERP Technique for Human Error-Rate Prediction 
TRC Time Reliability Curve 
TSC Technical Support Centre 
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1. Introduction 
Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) models are mostly very simplified with regard to mission 
times of safety functions, timings of events, recovery of safety functions and repair of 
components. Typically, a mission time of 24 hours is assumed for most safety functions in level 
1 PSA. Longer time windows are considered rarely, except in some level 2 PSAs and spent 
fuel pool analyses. The Fukushima nuclear power plant (NPP) accident however pointed out 
that it might be relevant to consider longer time windows in some accident scenarios (Burgazzi 
et al. 2014). 
The mission time of a typical safety system should be the time that the safety system needs to 
work in order to reach a safe, stable plant state. Therefore, fundamental questions are how the 
safe, stable state should be defined, and how the definition should be applied in practice. 
Another important concept is the success criteria of a safety system, the criteria on how the 
system needs to function so that the safe, stable state is achieved. The success criteria are 
typically determined based on deterministic plant simulations. The question of safe, stable 
state definition is as relevant in the context of deterministic analyses as in PSA. 
The goal of the project “Prolonged available time and safe states” (the NPSAG project 53-003 
PROSAFE) is to study how the safe, stable state should be defined, and whether it is 
necessary to adjust success criteria and mission times in PSA. It is expected that in some 
accident scenarios, there is a need to consider longer time windows. Current practice is that 
with 24 hour time windows, repairs and their effects need not be considered. Longer time 
windows bring in the need to model and analyse more recovery actions and component 
repairs, and to revise human reliability analyses (HRA), since such scenarios offer large time 
margins for human actions. Static event tree and fault tree modelling techniques may also 
need to be complemented by dynamic methods, and further development of PSA tools may 
be needed. In addition, the reliability data and uncertainties in longer time windows are worth 
considering. 
This report provides a state of the art review on long time windows and the definition of safe 
and stable state in PSA. Two main methods of inquiry have been utilized: a literature review 
and a questionnaire to the stakeholders of the PROSAFE project. Specific topics that are 
considered include safe, stable state, success criteria, mission time, HRA methods, crediting 
recoveries and repairs, reliability analysis methods, reliability data, and epistemic uncertainty. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Safe, stable state 
Several guidance documents provide some sort of a definition for safe stable state, safe state 
or controlled state. Table 1 presents definitions from different sources. The definitions are 
typically very short and open for interpretation. Some of the definitions are significantly different 
from each other. The definition of ASME/ANS RA-S-2009 is based solely on reactor coolant 
system conditions. Other definitions include criteria on safety functions. The definition in STUK 
Y/1/2018 is most specific requiring reactor shutdown, low pressure and removal of decay heat. 
IAEA documents include criteria on core sub-criticality in the definitions. 
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Table 1: Definitions for safe, stable state. 
Source Definition 
ASME/ANS RA-S-2009 Safe stable state: A plant condition, following an initiating 
event, in which [reactor coolant system] RCS conditions 
are controllable at or near desired values. 
STUK Y/1/2018 Safe state shall refer to a state where the reactor has 
been shut down and is non-pressurised, and removal of its 
decay heat has been secured. 
Controlled state shall refer to a state where a reactor has 
been shut down and the removal of its decay heat has 
been secured. 
Controlled state following a severe reactor accident 
shall refer to a state where the removal of decay heat from 
the reactor core debris and the containment has been 
secured, the temperature of the reactor core debris is 
stable or decreasing, the reactor core debris is in a form 
that poses no risk of re-criticality, and no significant 
volumes of fission products are any longer being released 
from the reactor core debris. 
Safe state following a severe reactor accident shall 
refer to a state where the conditions for the controlled 
state of a severe reactor accident are met and, in addition, 
the pressure inside the containment is low enough that 
leak from the containment is minor, even if the 
containment is not leak-tight. 
IAEA-SSG-2 Typically, it is assumed that a safe and stable end state 
is achieved when the core is covered and long term heat 
removal from both the core and the containment is 
achieved, and the core is, and will remain, subcritical by a 
given margin. 
IAEA-SSR-2/1 Safe state: Plant state, following an anticipated 
operational occurrence or accident conditions, in which the 
reactor is subcritical and the fundamental safety functions 
can be ensured and maintained stable for a long time. 
Controlled state: Plant state, following an anticipated 
operational occurrence or accident conditions, in which the 
fundamental safety functions can be ensured and which 
can be maintained for a time sufficient to effect provisions 
to reach a safe state. 
IAEA-TECDOC-1804 Safe stable state: A plant state, following an initiating 
event, in which plant conditions are controllable at or near 
desired values and within the success criteria for 
maintenance of safety functions. A safe stable state is 
achieved when the following criteria are met: 
 All required safety functions are successfully 
performed during the defined mission time. 
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 The safety functions are not expected to be lost at 
a point close-in-time after the specified mission 
time (i.e. there is compelling evidence that the 
successful safety functions have adequate 
operating capacity to be maintained for an 
indefinite period following the end of the specified 
mission time, or that there are adequate alternative 
means of performing the safety functions that can 
be implemented with high confidence after the 
specified mission time).  
Jacquemain et al. 2018 A plant is considered in a safe stable state when all 
components of the degraded core are in a coolable 
configuration, either still in place and/or relocated in-vessel 
and/or ex-vessel, and any stored spent fuel is also in a 
coolable configuration. The degraded core, if retained in-
vessel, is considered to have reached a coolable 
configuration when there is no further hydrogen production 
from water-metal (clad and structural materials) 
interaction, the release rate of fission products is 
exceedingly low and there is no risk of re-criticality or of 
corium rupturing the vessel. Similarly, the degraded core, 
if ex-vessel, is considered to have reached a coolable 
configuration when there is no further incondensable gas 
generation from molten core concrete interaction, release 
of fission products from core-concrete interactions is 
exceedingly small, there is no risk of re-criticality and the 
ex-vessel core debris is retained in the containment 
without breaching the containment integrity. The spent fuel 
inventory is considered in a coolable configuration if all the 
spent fuel rods, degraded or not, are confined in the pool 
without the risk of a runaway oxidation reaction, there is no 
significant production of hydrogen and no risk of criticality. 
NUREG-2122 Safe stable state: Condition of the reactor in which the 
necessary safety functions are achieved. 
In a PRA, safe stable states are represented by success 
paths in modeling of accident sequences. A safe stable 
state implies that the plant conditions are controllable 
within the success criteria for maintenance of safety 
functions. 
 
Each end point of level 1 PSA should be either a safe, stable state (or at least controlled state) 
or core/fuel damage state (IAEA-TECDOC-1804). However, the authors have not found any 
quantitative criteria for safe, stable state from literature, except concerning reactor sub-
criticality (effective multiplication factor less than 0.995 in STUK Y/1/2018). Success criteria 
analyses often consider a fixed time window, typically 24 hours, and it is studied whether core 
damage occurs during that time window or not given specific conditions (NUREG-1953, Butler 
et al. 2010). The basis for success criteria seems to be avoidance of core damage within the 
fixed time window rather than reaching a safe, stable state. For example, NUREG/CR-7177 
studies definitions of core damage surrogates for success criteria analysis. The conditions at 
end points of the analyses are examined to check if the plant is in a stable state or safe stable 
state, but it is not specified what it exactly means, and the time point where safe stable state 
is reached is not determined. 
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Ma & Buell (2016) have studied safe and stable state in event tree modelling with quite similar 
scope as the PROSAFE project. They have considered the definitions from ASME/ANS RA-
S-2009 and NUREG-2122, and have not specified any quantitative acceptance criteria for safe 
state. They point out the importance of checking the trends of plant parameters, such as core 
temperature, i.e. are the parameter values stable or changing at the end of a thermal-hydraulic 
analysis. If the parameter values are steady, the plant state can be assumed safe and stable. 
If the parameter values are changing, the mission time of the thermal-hydraulic analysis should 
be increased. In such a case, Ma & Buell recommend a mission time of 72 hours if it is 
practically possible. 
In some PSAs, controlled states are used as end states instead of safe states. ASAMPSA_E 
(2015) points out the issue that safety analyses should be performed to the point where a 
controlled plant state is reached. ASAMPSA_E does not provide a definition, but states that it 
should be “defined by clear criteria for plant parameters and availability of essential safety 
functions.” It states also that “challenges to such a controlled state should require additional, 
independent events in PSAs modelling.” 
ANS/ASME-58.22-2014 argues that for low power and shutdown (LPSD) PSA, there may be 
a need to evaluate successful end states of the at-power PSA to examine potential failures 
during repair and through start-up, e.g. feed and bleed cooling, high pressure recirculation, low 
pressure recirculation, and states with reactivity controlled but without the control rods inserted. 
They however conclude that these scenarios are low in frequency and often are neglected. 
For severe accidents, the definitions of safe, stable state are more complicated. They also 
address the conditions related to reactor core debris and its coolability, and the release rate of 
fission products. The definition in STUK Y/1/2018 concerns also conditions of the containment. 
Jacquemain et al. (2018) specify also criteria that there should not be significant hydrogen 
production or core-concrete interaction anymore. 
Jacquemain et al. (2018) state that some severe accident management guidelines specify 
acceptance criteria for a controlled, stable state after a severe accident. The variables used in 
the criteria include core exit temperature, hydrogen content, the pressure of the containment, 
radiation levels and the water level of the spent fuel pool. The criteria are however not 
presented in (Jacquemain et al. 2018). 
2.2 Success criteria 
The definitions of success criteria from different sources are often similar, e.g. as stated in 
ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009: “Criteria for establishing the minimum number or combinations of 
systems or components required to operate, or minimum levels of performance per component 
during a specific period of time, to ensure that the safety functions are satisfied.” Table 2 
presents definitions from different sources. 
NUREG-2122 states that PSA uses several different types of success criteria, e.g.  for different 
safety functions, for system functions needed to support the safety functions, and for the 
components within these systems. The success criteria specify how the systems and 
components must function, when they must begin to function, and how long they must function. 
The success criteria are typically developed by thermo-hydraulic analyses that represent the 
design and operation of the plant being evaluated, and where deterministic acceptance criteria 
are defined for the different safety functions.  
Normally, success criteria in the PSA are defined relative to the initial requirements when an 
initiating event has occurred, and rarely take into account the possibility of increased safety 
margins, and thus less stringent requirements, some time after the initiating event. The time 
period, i.e. the mission time, during which the specified criteria need to be fulfilled is in most 
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cases set to 24 hours (PSA level 1) or 48 hours (PSA level 2), even though the required time 
may be shorter. ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 requires for all Capability Categories that the effect 
of variable success criteria (for system functions) due to time dependence shall be 
incorporated into the system modelling. 
ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 requires for Capability Category II that acceptance criteria are chosen 
such that the determination of core damage is as realistic as possible, and with enough margin 
to code-calculated values to allow for limitations in the code. Examples of core damage 
surrogates are given as: 
a. Collapsed liquid level less than 1⁄3 core height or code-predicted peak core 
temperature > 2500 °F (1371.1°C, BWR) 
b. Collapsed liquid level below top of active fuel for a prolonged period, or code-
predicted core peak node temperature > 2,200 °F (1204.9 °C) using a code with 
detailed core modelling, or 
code-predicted core peak node temperature > 1,800 °F (982.2 °C) using a code 
with simplified (e.g., single-node core model, lumped parameter) core 
modelling, or 
code-predicted core exit temperature > 1,200 °F (648.9 °C) for 30 min using a 
code with simplified core modelling (PWR) 
 
NUREG/CR-7177 also studies definitions of core damage surrogates for success criteria 
calculations with thermo-hydraulic analysis and defines a peak cladding temperature of 2200°F 
(1204.9°C) as an appropriate surrogate for core damage at at-power analysis. For shutdown 
conditions they recommend a combination of surrogates, e.g. a reactor pressure vessel water 
level of one-third of the fuel height as a precursor to fuel damage and a peak cladding 
temperature of 1204.85 °C as a precursor to core damage.  
ANS/ASME-58.22-2014 states that changes of success criteria during a plant operating state 
(POS) requires a change in the POS interval and an additional POS to be defined. 
Ma & Buell (2016) have addressed the definition of success criteria in their study of safe and 
stable state, by using the definition of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009. They point out the close 
relation between safe and stable state, mission time and success criteria, and that a success 
criterion shall include a specified mission time a safety function needs to operate in order for 
the reactor to reach a safe and stable state. They present an iterative process for developing 
success criteria that a) "represent the minimum number of systems/components and human 
actions that are required to ensure the safety function” and b) results in a safe stable state 
verified by thermo-hydraulic analysis results. 
In the aftermath of the Fukushima accident it was recognised that present state-of-the-art PSA 
contain several insufficiencies, e.g. concerning the consideration of long scenario analysis 
times and mission times but also concerning that success criteria should be clearly defined for 
reaching a long term stable end state (ASAMPSA_E 2015). Consideration of partial core 
damage was also identified to result in the need for development of specific success criteria. 
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Table 2: Definitions of Success Criteria. 
Source Definition 
ASME/ANS RA-S-2009 Success Criteria: Criteria for establishing the minimum 
number or combinations of systems or components required to 
operate, or minimum levels of performance per component 
during a specific period of time, to ensure that the safety 
functions are satisfied. 
The term accident success criteria is a technical element in 
the ASME/ANS PRA Standard whose objectives are to define 
the plant-specific measures of success and failure that support 
the other technical elements of the PRA. The minimum 
combination of systems and components needed to carry out 
the safety functions given an initiating event. 
IAEA-TECDOC-1511 Success criteria regarding the plant response to initiating 
events are used to specify whether safety related functions 
meet the requirements to prevent damage to the core or 
mitigate significant releases of radioactivity. These safety-
related functions in terms of a PSA may be functions of 
operating systems, front line safety systems, I&C, support 
systems, structures, components, and operator actions. For 
operator actions success criteria are characterized by 
statements that certain actions are successfully carried out 
within a defined time window. 
NUREG-2122 The minimum combination of systems and components needed 
to carry out the safety functions given an initiating event. 
 
2.3 Mission time 
ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 defines mission time as “the time period that a system or component 
is required to operate in order to successfully perform its function.” For many safety functions, 
the mission time must be the time it takes to bring the plant to a safe, stable state (IAEA-
TECDOC-1804). The mission time is however often just set conservatively to 24 hours based 
on earlier experience without detailed analysis. This approach has been criticised, e.g. in 
ASAMPSA_E (2015). A more realistic approach is to use suitable deterministic computer code 
to determine how long it takes to bring the plant to safe state. The mission time analysis is 
closely connected to success criteria analysis, and e.g. same thermo-hydraulic calculations 
may be utilised in both analyses. 
In a typical PSA, the mission time is 24 hours for most safety functions. The Fukushima 
accident however demonstrated that it can be relevant and more realistic to consider longer 
mission times (Burgazzi et al. 2014). For example, in cases of long term station blackout or 
loss of ultimate heat sink, mission times of 48 hours or 72 hours could come into question. 
Shorter mission times than 24 hours have also been considered. Risk assessment of 
operational events handbook (USNRC 2017b) provides an example that in the case of loss of 
coolant accident (LOCA), the mission time of low pressure injection could be 1 hour, after 
which recirculation needs to function 23 hours. 
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Risk assessment of operational events handbook (USNRC 2017b) states that the mission time 
of emergency diesel generators has been determined based on the mean recovery time of the 
offsite power in some PSAs. In the case of loss of offsite power, there are examples of shorter 
(e.g. 2 hours) and longer mission times (e.g. 72 hours) (WGRISK 2017). 72 hours have been 
used for containment systems and spent fuel pool analysis. 
If a safe, stable state has not been achieved at the end of the mission time, IAEA-TECDOC-
1804 recommends one of the following alternatives: 
 Assigning an appropriate plant damage state for the sequence, 
 Extending the mission time to the point where a safe, stable state is reached, 
 Modelling of additional system recovery or operator interactions that bring the plant to 
a safe, stable state. 
As the current best practise, Ma & Buell (2016) recommend 72 hours as the maximum mission 
time, because the accuracy of the analysis is expected to decrease with longer time windows, 
and the likelihood that non-modelled mitigation/recovery actions terminate the accident 
increases. They recommend sensitivity analyses for such scenarios. 
If different mission times need to be modelled for the same event in different scenarios, an 
option is to use different basic events for different mission times in the PSA model. Recovery 
rules or fault tree configurations management techniques can be used to select the correct 
basic event for the analysed accident sequence. Use of multiple basic events to represent 
different mission times can however be somewhat inconvenient e.g. in risk importance 
measure computation, but it seems that current PSA tools do not offer better options to handle 
the issue. A possibility to facilitate the modelling could be to develop functionality to select the 
mission time of a basic event based on the accident sequence. 
2.4 Crediting recoveries and repairs 
In PSA, there is a clear distinction between actions to repair components or systems and 
actions to recover components or systems (NUREG/CR-6823).  
 Recovery actions involve the use of alternate equipment or means to perform a safety 
function when primary equipment fails, or the use of alternate means to utilize 
equipment that has not responded as required. Examples of recovery actions include 
opening doors to promote room cooling when an HVAC system fails, recovering grid-
related losses of offsite power by rerouting power, manually initiating a system when 
the automatic actuation signal fails, bypassing trip logic using jumper cables, and using 
a handwheel to manually open a motor-operated valve when the motor fails to operate.  
 Repair actions involve the elimination or mitigation of the faults that caused a 
component or system to fail, and bringing it to operable state. Examples of repair 
actions include repairing weather-related losses of offsite power, repair of a pump that 
failed to start, or replacement of a failed circuit breaker. 
There are two main issues in crediting recoveries and repairs in the PSA model: 
 How to assess the probability that recovery or repair is successful in a given time 
window (or more generally, probability distribution of the time that recovery or repair of 
the system takes).  
 How to model recovery or repair of the safety system in the PSA model. 
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PSA models typically include a number of recovery actions. For example, the recovery of offsite 
power is a recovery event that has often been modelled in PSA. Recovery of emergency diesel 
generators has also been modelled in many PSAs (USNRC 2017b). Concerning offsite power, 
multiple possible recovery times are often modelled (WGRISK 2017). 
Because recovery actions can involve complicated actions that are usually governed by 
procedures, most are typically evaluated using HRA methods. A general exception is the 
treatment of offsite power recovery where the required recovery actions are often not within 
the jurisdiction of the plant personnel. Thus, offsite power recovery data is collected for use in 
PSAs (NUREG/CR-6823). 
The repair of components is typically not modelled in PSA because one or more of the following 
apply to most minimal cut sets and accident sequences (USNRC 2017b): (1) the time available 
to repair most components is generally too limited (i.e., core damage would occur before the 
repair is completed), (2) repair is an action that is not always governed by procedures and thus 
difficult to model, (3) the availability of spare parts is not always certain, and (4) abnormal 
procedures generally direct operators to rather use alternative equipment.  
2.4.1 Modelling and analysis of recoveries and repairs 
There are three main approaches to analyse recoveries and repairs: the judgmental approach, 
the statistical approach and the systems approach. In the judgmental approach, an expert or 
a group of experts assess and give estimates on various quantities of interest. In the statistical 
approach, the model is derived from available data, with the internal logic of the recovery or 
repair being of secondary concern. In the systems approach, the recovery or repair is 
considered to consist of more than one constituent parts (activities), and the model consists of 
models for the activities and the dependences between them. Also hybrids of two or all three 
approaches may be used. 
There are several types of risk associated with recoveries and repairs, such as performance 
risk (the repaired/recovered system does not fill its performance requirements), side effect risk 
(the repair/recovery action compromises some SSCs of the plant), cost risk and occupational 
health risk, but the main emphasis in PSA has been on schedule risk. This is the risk that the 
recovery or repair may be completed too late from the accident progression point of view. 
In the judgmental approach, various methods to elicit probabilities and other quantities from 
experts have been developed, and various issues to take into account in the process have 
been identified (e.g. Ortiz et al. 1991, Cooke 1991, Meyer & Booker 2001, Ayyub 2001, 
O’Hagan et al. 2006). Humans are notoriously prone to various errors of judgment, and these 
have to be taken into account in formulating the questions posed to the experts. Also, other 
issues have to be taken into account, for example that experts are not asked to supply too 
many estimates. Nevertheless, the judgmental approach is often used when enough data is 
not available and when a systems model of the repair/recovery cannot or will not be built. 
In the statistical approach, the main method used to model the uncertain completion time of 
an action is to fit a probability distribution to the data. There are many probability distributions 
that can be used, for example the exponential, normal, Weibull, gamma and lognormal 
distribution (see, e.g. Bury 1999). The lognormal distribution is often used in the modelling of 
the duration of human activities, because analysis of data has shown that maintenance times 
tend to be lognormally distributed (O’Connor & Kleyner 2012 p. 410). Nevertheless, the choice 
of distribution depends on what kind of activity is being modelled and how well each distribution 
fits the data available.  
Recoveries and repairs are results of human actions. These actions may consist of several 
interdependent activities, and they may be carried out by more than one person. Thus, there 
is some justification to consider them as operations (or projects). There are two systems 
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approaches to the risk analysis of recoveries and repairs: one based on operation or project 
risk analysis, and one based on human reliability analysis. 
One approach to the modelling and analysis of recoveries and repairs as contributors to risk is 
provided by project risk analysis, although its use in the nuclear safety field seems to have 
been minor so far (perhaps partly because repairs and recoveries have received relatively little 
attention). In this approach (Williams 2002), a recovery or repair is viewed as consisting of a 
set of activities (also called tasks) that have precedence constraints between them and that 
are performed with some resources (humans, spare parts, materials etc.). The set of activities 
may be obtained by constructing a work breakdown structure (Norman et al. 2008). In the 
analysis of schedule risk, the most common quantitative methods are the critical path method 
(CPM), project evaluation and review technique (PERT), and Monte Carlo simulation of activity 
networks (Munier 2014). Performance risks have received much less attention than schedule 
risks, but in principle they can be accounted for by e.g. fault trees. 
Risk assessment of operational events handbook (USNRC 2017b) summarizes the following 
factors from the PRA standard supporting requirements (ASME RA-Sa-2009) which should be 
considered in the analysis of recovery actions as well as repairs: 
- plausibility and feasibility of the action in the analysed scenarios, 
- availability of procedures, operator training, cues and manpower, 
- scenario-specific performance shaping factors in the HRA, 
- dependencies between human failure events in scenarios, accident sequences or 
minimal cut sets. 
The handbook also contains a more detailed list of questions to be considered when modelling 
recoveries and repairs. In addition, it presents some examples of failure events and potential 
recovery/repair actions. The list provided by the handbook is not complete, because e.g. the 
availability of spare parts is not considered. 
Risk assessment of operational events handbook (USNRC 2017b) states that HRA techniques 
for estimating the likelihood of successful repair should not be used. This is because the 
possible repair scenarios, which are affected by a variety of human actions and hardware-
related issues, would not be known without knowing the specific causes of the problem. There 
are however exceptions, such as the replacement of fuses, which can be performed rather 
quickly since spare fuses are available. In that case, the failure probability for the repair can 
be estimated by HRA or statistical analysis based on available repair data.  
Existing HRA methods may be subjected to criticism also on the ground that they usually have 
a too simplistic view on repair time and factors that affect it. Some methods also may be 
inapplicable due to various reasons: for example, sufficient data might not exist to estimate the 
parameters of a repair time probability distribution. 
Kichline (2018) points out that current HRA methods were not developed to quantify the human 
error probabilities (HEPs) associated with the transportation, placement, connection, or local 
control of portable equipment. Existing HRA methods may model certain types of actions and 
some performance shaping factors similar to those associated with the use of portable 
equipment. However, the HEPs were not developed for the context of FLEX (flexible coping 
strategies) actions (e.g., the HEP for a human task in the technique for human error-rate 
prediction (THERP) might be very different from the HEP of the same task in the scenario that 
results in the use of FLEX equipment). 
Recovery/repair data used in probability estimation should reflect accident conditions 
(NUREG/CR-6823). Data from non-accident conditions should not be used, because there is 
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no similar pressure for the performance of the action. NUREG/CR-6823 provides guidance for 
probability estimation based on operating data. 
2.4.2 Recoveries and repairs in PSA model 
Recoveries and repairs of safety relevant SSCs, whether successful or not, may significantly 
change accident progression. Therefore, they need to be considered in the plant PSA model 
if the mission time is sufficiently long so that recoveries and repairs may credibly take place. 
Recoveries/repairs of failure to run events may need to be modelled separately from failure on 
demand events (USNRC 2017b). If a component works some time before it fails, the time 
available for recovery/repair can be extended significantly, because the time to core damage 
is delayed. Failure times are therefore highly relevant when considering recoveries and repairs, 
and modelling of failure times can affect recovery/repair modelling significantly. However, in 
PSAs, failure to run events are typically conservatively assumed to occur at the time of the 
demand. 
Another issue is that repair time can depend significantly on the specific failure causes and 
how the component exactly fails. Accurate repair modelling may therefore require division of a 
failure basic event into multiple events. For example, failures could be divided into those that 
can be repaired in a short time and those that require long repair times on the average. This 
might require re-evaluation of the failure data. The division could be done either explicitly in 
the PSA model or in background calculations providing inputs for the PSA model. 
Recoveries and repairs can be modelled in PSA at the event tree level, fault tree level, 
sequence level and minimal cut set level (USNRC 2017b). Recoveries from initiating events 
and main safety functions are typically modelled at the event tree level as additional event tree 
branches. Recoveries and repairs of individual components and subsystems are usually 
modelled at the fault tree level. A typical example of fault tree modelling is that the component 
failure basic event and the failure to recover/repair basic event are set under an AND gate. 
Scenario-specific basic events can be used for the same recovery/repair event if the probability 
of the recovery/repair varies depending the scenario. Techniques to handle such cases include 
recovery rules and use of multiple configurations of the same fault tree. Different fault tree 
configuration can, for instance, be applied to different accident sequences. Recovery rules can 
be used to manipulate minimal cut sets (USNRC 2017b). 
When the failure of the safety function has a major impact on accident progression, modelling 
recovery or repair at the event tree level is called for. In the simplest case, the recovery/repair 
of the component/subsystem/structure may be represented as a section in the event tree. The 
success criterion of the recovery/repair is that it is completed within some given time frame. If 
accident progression differs significantly depending on when the recovery/repair occurs, 
modelling of several time limits can be considered and several branches may be added to the 
tree in the recovery/repair section. This type of modelling may however make event trees very 
complicated, and therefore, the conventional event tree/fault tree based modelling approach is 
not the most suitable method for detailed recovery modelling. 
Risk assessment of operational events handbook (USNRC 2017b) states that the recovery 
and repair modelling should credit only one component in a system if there are multiple failed 
components. If there are failures in two systems, the possibility to recover/repair both requires 
case-specific consideration. If one failure can be recovered quickly from the control room, e.g. 
by simple trip reset, there may be time for another recovery or repair. In the case of multiple 
recoveries/repairs or recovery/repair combined with other human error events, it is important 
to analyse the dependencies. 
If a component has a large failure probability, it may be relevant to consider second failure 
after recovery or repair. 
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Recovery of emergency core cooling systems is sometimes modelled in level 2 PSA 
(ASAMPSA2 2013). The recovery may also induce additional risk, if the recovery can occur in 
a critical time window to produce large amounts of hydrogen. Therefore, instead of modelling 
only success and failure of recovery, modelling of different recovery times may be needed to 
make the analysis realistic. Recovery time modelling in simulation-based containment event 
trees has been studied in (Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019). 
2.5 Human reliability analysis methods 
How to account for available time is an important issue in HRA, especially for the post-initiator 
human failure events (HFEs) (Category C). Historically the main focus for Category C HRA 
has been on supporting Level 1 PSA, that is, to estimate the likelihood of the main control room 
(MCR) operators failing to implement the emergency operating procedures (EOPs) in a 
number of accident scenarios that might end up in damaging the reactor core. The typical 
available times for nuclear power plant level 1 human actions are among 30 minutes to 1 or 2 
hours. The existing HRA methods are developed to cope with this situation. 
It seems that HRA of field workers other than operators (such as maintenance personnel) has 
not received much attention in HRA literature. Even though pre-initiator (Category A) HFEs are 
related to the maintenance personnel, they are typically latent errors that the personnel make 
during normal situations at the plant. Nevertheless, the success or failure of these NPP workers 
in repair and many recovery activities may affect accident progression significantly in long time 
window scenarios.  
2.5.1 Human reliability as a function of time  
Human error probability of a typical Category C HFE includes both diagnosis (e.g. detection, 
decision making) error probability and execution error probability (IAEA 50-P-10, 1996).  
NUREG-1921 (NUREG-1921, 2012) provides a timeline illustration diagram (Figure 1), and 
shows the definitions of start time, time delay, available time, cognition time, execution time 
and required time. 
 
Figure 1: Timeline illustration diagram (NUREG-1921). 
The terms associated with each timing element are defined mathematically. 
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 T0 = start time = start of the event 
 Tdelay = time delay = duration of time it takes for an operator to acknowledge the cue 
 Tsw = system time window, is the time from the start of the event until the action is no 
longer beneficial (typically when irreversible damage occurs, such as core damage or 
component damage). The system time window represents the maximum amount of 
time available for the action. 
 Tavail = time available = time available for action = (Tsw - Tdelay) 
 Tcog = cognition time consisting of detection, diagnosis, and decision making 
 Texe = execution time including travel, collection of tools, donning personnel protection 
equipment (PPE), and manipulation of components 
 Treqd = time required = response time to accomplish the action = (Tcog + Texe) 
In addition to the above terms, time margin is used in several HRA methods. Time margin can 
be defined as the ratio of time available for the recovery action to the time required to perform 
the action (Tcog+Texe) and is calculated as follows: 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 (𝑇𝑀) =
𝑇𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙 − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑑
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑑
× 100% 
For the diagnosis part, the available time has always been an important factor. Some HRA 
methods consider time as the dominant factor in diagnosis HEP estimation, e.g. human 
cognitive reliability (HCR)/operator reliability experiments (ORE) (Parry 1992) or time reliability 
curve (TRC) in THERP (NUREG/CR-1278, 1983). Some HRA methods consider time as one 
of the performance shaping factors (PSFs), e.g. SPAR-H (NUREG/CR-6883, 2005). 
In general the time reliability curves used in HRA assume that the probability of a human failure 
event (its cognitive part and execution part) will be lower when the available time is longer. 
Figure 2 presents the TRC used in THERP for diagnosis HEPs. The nominal median HEP is 
1E-4 for diagnosis of the first initiating event 60 minutes after the event cues (signals) appear 
in the main control room. The HEP will be lower when the time is longer.  
 
Figure 2: Time reliability curve used in THERP for diagnosis human error probabilities 
(NUREG/CR-1278). 
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In SPAR-H the available time is one of the eight PSFs in the HEP estimation. Table 2 shows 
the multipliers for the available time PSF for LPSD tasks. With the expansive time, the multiplier 
can be 0.1 to 0.01 for the diagnosis (nominal diagnosis HEP is 1E-2) and 0.01 for the action 
(nominal action HEP is 1E-3) part of LPSD tasks. 
Table 2: Available time performance shaping factor for low power and shutdown 
(NUREG/CR-6883). 
Case Available time PSF Multiplier Notes 
LPSD: 
Available time 
for diagnosis 
Inadequate time P(failure) = 1.0 * Analyst’s choice, 
depending on 
complexity of 
diagnosis, including 
multiple factors such 
as available help and 
likelihood of additional 
cues. 
** Analyst’s choice, 
depending on 
complexity, PPE, 
work environment and 
ease of checking and 
recovery. 
Barely adequate time 
(approximately 2/3 x nominal) 
10 
Nominal time 1 
Extra time (between 1 and 2 x 
nominal) 
0.1 
Expansive time (> 2x nominal) 0.1 to 0.01* 
LPSD: 
Available time 
for action 
Inadequate time P(failure) = 1.0 
Time available is 
approximately equal to time 
required 
10 
Nominal time 1 
Time available is ≥ 5x the time 
required 
0.1 
Time available is ≥ 50x the 
time required 
0.01** 
 
There are important issues connected with the use of TRC methods in HRA. The first is the 
risk that some HRA methods, e.g. HCR/ORE or TRC of THERP, might produce unrealistically 
low diagnosis HEPs when time is considered as the dominant factor in the 
estimation/calculation of HEPs for human failure events (HFEs) with longer time frames. To 
avoid unrealistic estimation of low HEP, NRC (NUREG-1792, 2005) suggests that some 
limiting HEPs should be defined, considering the uncertainties. In UK, the human performance 
limiting value (HPLV) is typically set as 1E-5. However, for optimal conditions and scenarios 
with excessive time scales (> 12 hours) the HPLV can be justified as 1E-7.  
The cause based decision tree (CBDT) method was intended to address actions with longer 
time frames that were outside the valid range of extrapolation for the monotonically decreasing 
HCR/ORE TRC. CBDT considers a relatively large set of potential PSFs and operator 
influences (e.g., quality of training, procedures, the human-machine interface, recovery 
potential) and uses a series of decision trees to establish the HEP. However, CBDT appears 
to be a method for treating post-initiator control room actions only (guidance and data for 
quantifying local actions is not provided) through a time-independent quantification approach. 
In that approach, time is considered qualitatively in addressing the potential for self-recovery 
of an error or recovery by another crew member. As a result, any analytical (i.e., not based on 
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plant specific human error data) non time-related HRA method could be used for treating longer 
time frames in the way CBDT does. 
A second issue with TRC methods is that they use time as the main (or only) determinant for 
the HEP, in which case it works as a proxy cause for the combined effect of all underlying 
causes of human error or non-response. Concern is raised about using the HCR/ORE and 
THERP TRC blindly across many different scenarios and contexts without consideration of 
other factors that may be more dominant error causes, thus arriving at optimistic estimates 
(NUREG-1842, p. A-2). This is especially serious when plant/context specific data are not 
collected and generic TRCs are used. The TRC in THERP is based on expert judgment derived 
from some early simulator data collections by General Physics and Oak Ridge. The TRC of 
the HCR/ORE was developed by EPRI in a simulator data collection program called ORE to 
examine the validity of the original HCR curves (Jung & Park 2019). The results of ORE 
experiments did not support the use of the four factors originally included in the HCR TRCs 
(i.e., training, human-system interface, experience, stress). The factors were dropped from the 
HCR/ORE approach (NUREG-1842, p. 3-50) leaving time (available time and crew response 
time) as the only determinant for the HEP. It is thus an important assumption of the HCR/ORE 
method that the influence of important plant-specific factors will be implicitly included in the 
simulator-based, time-to-respond data that is collected at the plant and/or in the plant-specific 
estimates obtained from operators (NUREG-1842, p. 3-51). 
2.5.2 Longer time windows 
Most reference sources for HEPs are typically about main control room operating crews’ tasks 
performed in a relatively short period of time (e.g., THERP considers less than two hours after 
the initiating event, NUREG/CR-1278, Figure 17-2, page 17-15). The Savannah River State 
human error data base development for non-reactor nuclear facilities (Benhardt et al. 1994) 
calculated the failure probability of longer time window tasks. These were called “long-term 
accident recovery” actions and were defined as “the failure to diagnose a situation and to 
correctly identify a recovery action when hours to days are available for the recovery”. Using 
THERP fault tree modelling three failure probability values were proposed based on the 
available time for accident recovery and other conditions such as training, quality of 
procedures, and stress. As no installation-specific data were available for long time windows 
tasks, the recommended HEPs are the result of a THERP analysis in which median HEPs are 
converted into mean HEPs (based on the lognormal distribution for the HEPs) and rounded to 
1, 3, or 5 times the appropriate power of ten. The HEPs were thus recommended for the non-
reactor facilities (e.g., plutonium storage, waste tanks, solid waste disposal or defence waste 
processing). These probabilities are presented in Table 3.  
Table 3: Recommended human error probabilities for long time windows actions at 
Savannah River State non-reactor facilities (Benhardt et al. 1994). 
Nominal mean value 3.0E-3 EF = 10 Use: 24 to 48 hours for recovery, simple 
recovery actions 
High mean value 1.0E-1 EF = 3 Use: Less than 24 hours for recovery 
Low mean value 3.0E-5 EF = 10 Use: Three to seven days for recovery, 
simple recovery actions 
 
The nominal mean value provided is 3.0E-3. This assumes that (a) recovery actions are to be 
completed within 24 to 48 hours following the initiating event, (b) stress is moderately high for 
the operators on shift during the initiating event but decreases to optimal levels for subsequent 
shifts, (c) there is low dependence on the previous shift, (d) procedures with checklist are 
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followed, and (e) the second shift personnel might recover any errors made by the previous 
shift. The high mean value failure probability is 1.0E-1. It differs by the nominal case by 
assuming extremely high stress levels due to recovery actions to be completed within a short 
time frame of approximately 2 to 24 hours and by eliminating the two recoveries modelled in 
the nominal THERP tree. The low mean value failure probability considers an extended time 
window of three to seven days and thus optimal stress levels and recovery possibility, and is 
estimated at 3.0E-5. 
Prolonged available time issue is also related to level 2 PSA since HRA needs to include a 
more comprehensive and realistic assessment of influences of long-term post-core damage 
events (ASAMPSA_E, 2015). Long-term post-core damage sequences, with time windows for 
severe accident management guideline actions spanning from several hours up to 72 hours, 
invoke new issues regarding the timing of operator actions. For example, in the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi NPP accident, the opening of containment vent valves was unexpectedly delayed by 
several hours by: 1) waiting for a nearby town to be evacuated, 2) hardware failures, and 3) 
harsh environment conditions that developed during the waiting time. For these prolonged 
scenarios, potential time delays need to be accounted for in a realistic manner. The lack of 
contingency procedures and pre-staged equipment impacted operator actions, so that 
operators had to operate outside the procedural space or formal training. Relevant PSFs, such 
as fatigue (e.g., operators in the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP event had long shifts with minimal 
food and rest) and “stress” in a very real sense.  
Another potentially important aspect of long-term scenarios is the impact of shift changeover 
on the reliability of measure. Shift changeovers may lead to a loss of information or situational 
awareness, thus inducing additional sources of human error. In a longer time scenario, the 
plant crisis organization would be in place. The potential impacts of multiple decision makers 
on the performance should be considered realistically. 
HRA in a longer time window might be related to knowledge-based decisions and actions for 
mitigating an accident. Therefore, it should be considered how to systematically analyse 
knowledge-based decisions and actions in a longer time window. This is considered as one of 
the needs in level 2 HRA for those post-core damage HFEs.  
When there are longer available times, the potential new human actions should also be 
considered, e.g. recovery and repair actions. The credit and considerations of recovery and 
repair actions are discussed in section 2.4.  
It is noted that ASME PRA standard requires to account for any dependency between the HFE 
for operator recovery and any other HFEs in the sequence, scenario, or cut set to which the 
recovery is applied (ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009). NPSAG HRA dependencies project reports 
provide good summaries on how to assess the dependency level and how to consider use of 
minimum values for joint HEPs (He et al. 2016 & 2017). 
2.6  Risk and reliability analysis methods 
In this section, mathematical methods and models applicable to risk and reliability analysis for 
accident scenarios with long mission times are considered. In practice, they are methods that 
enable crediting repairs and recoveries, and also facilitate modelling situations where the order 
of events can vary and the order matters. Dynamic PSA methods fit these requirements. 
Static fault tree and minimal cut set based techniques have significant limitations in modelling 
time related aspects. In level 1 PSA, the static and simplified approach has mostly been 
considered sufficient, but when modelling longer time windows, the limitations of the approach 
become more evident. In level 2 PSA, there has been more variety in the use of methods 
because of the dynamic behaviour of severe reactor accidents. Some level 2 PSAs rely on 
static event trees and fault trees, whereas some other level 2 PSAs use more advanced event 
tree techniques (ASAMPSA2 2011, Tyrväinen et al. 2016, Guigueno et al. 2016). 
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In principle, PSAs could be made more realistic by using dynamic methods (Aldemir 2013), 
e.g. dynamic and simulation-based event trees (Metzroth 2011, Karanki et al. 2015, Queral et 
al. 2018, Tyrväinen et al. 2016, Tyrväinen & Karanta 2019). On the other hand, the static 
approach has significant benefits, such as minimal cut sets, reasonable computation times, 
transparency of the model and easiness of the modelling. In addition, change of the method 
would be laborious. In the short run, it could be more realistic to consider incorporation of 
dynamic analyses to the static models, e.g. by more accurate computation of minimal cut set 
frequencies by dynamic methods (Bäckström et al. 2018), use of time-dependent basic events 
(USNRC 2017) or crediting convolution (USNRC 2017, Smith 2016). Convolution could be 
used e.g. in the combined analysis of emergency diesel generator failure times and offsite 
power recovery time (USNRC 2017). Complementary dynamic analyses could also be used to 
improve PSA models in some specific scenarios (Mandelli et al. 2019). 
Markov models are a dynamic method to model state transitions of systems and components 
(Bucci et al. 2008). Markov models are particularly useful in modelling repairs and recovery 
actions. Markov models are likely not practical for plant-wide modelling, but can be effective 
and accurate in the analysis of individual systems. Hassija et al. (2014) present a good 
example on the application of Markov models to a long time window scenario with time-
dependent success criterion. 
Initiators and All Barriers (I&AB) is a dynamic methodology developed by EDF (Industrial Risks 
Management Department, France) and which is implemented in RiskSpectrum® PSA. It 
enables taking repair into account in a practical way in a full scope PSA application at the same 
time as you can actually define sequence specific time intervals referring to the available time 
to repair failed components until the undesirable end state occurs. Implementation of I&AB in 
RiskSpectrum® PSA is further described in (Bäckström et al. 2018). The PSA model is solved 
in the same way as for a static PSA, resulting in a minimal cut sets list to be quantified. These 
cut sets are then quantified using the I&AB method. This method is an analytic conservative 
approximation of the continuous time Markov chains for the cut set. It captures the most 
important dynamic behaviour of a failure mode (that is, the first-order dependence between 
failures of barrier components), while offering an approximate analytical method. 
2.7 Reliability data 
Basic events in PSA are normally divided into unavailability (because the equipment is 
undergoing testing or maintenance), failure to start or change state, and failure to run (after 
successfully starting) or maintain state to the end of the required mission time (NUREG-6823, 
2002).  
The basic event representing fail to run (FTR) is typically modelled with the reliability model 
‘mission time’ which calculates the failure probability based on the failure rate and the mission 
time.  
 
𝑄(𝑡) = 𝑞 + (1 − 𝑞)(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑇𝑚) = 1 − (1 − 𝑞)𝑒−𝜆𝑇𝑚 
 
where 𝑄(𝑡) is the failure probability of the component; 𝑞 is mission time independent failure 
probability for the component; 𝜆 is failure rate; 𝑇𝑚 is the mission time. 
 
This reliability model is used for most components, which have a mission time. Failures are 
assumed Poisson distributed which implies that the failure rate 𝜆 does not change during the 
mission time. The model also assumes that the component cannot be repaired within the 
mission time period (non-repairable).  
In reality, failure rates of some components are not constant. The assumption of constant 
failure rate might particularly be unrealistic in long mission time scenarios.  
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For emergency diesel generators (EDGs), the available data are in general applicable only for 
short mission times since the operating experience is mainly based on the performed periodical 
tests, when the diesels functioning duration is generally short. 
Grant et al. (1999) used reported EDG failures from tests performed at plants that reported 
under RG-1.108 requirements during the study period (1987-1993). These tests required the 
EDGs to run for 24 hours. There were 27 FTR events observed in the cyclic surveillance test 
data. The duration of the EDG run times prior to the failure of the EDG were reported in 19 of 
the licensee event reports. Based on analysis of these data the study concluded that three 
distinct failure rates existed. The failure rate during the first half an hour was 2.5E-2 per hour. 
The failure rate decreased significantly to 1.8E-3 per hour for the period between 0.5 hours 
and 14 hours. For periods greater than 14 hours, the failure rate again decreased to 2.5E-4 
per hour. Figure 3 illustrates the estimation of the three different failure rates. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative number of EDG FTR events observed during the cyclic surveillance 
tests as a function of the time of the failure (Grant et al. 1999). 
They commented that the early, middle, and late failures seem to correspond in part to different 
failure mechanisms. The change in the failure rate per hour was linked to a change in the 
mechanism of the EDG train failures. That is, the cooling subsystem dominated the early 
failures, accounting for about one-third of all the failures that occurred during the first half an 
hour; the electrical and fuel subsystems combined account for half of the failures in the period 
between 0.5 hours and 14 hours; and beyond 14 hours the only failure observed occurred in 
the electrical subsystem. 
In comparison to the EDG failure data applied in US PSA or individual plant examination (IPE) 
study, approximately 80% of the PSA/IPEs reviewed by Grant used a single hourly failure rate 
for the entire mission time. The average failure rate for these PSA/IPEs is 5.9E-3 per hour. 
The remaining PSA/IPEs differentiated between less than one hour and greater than one hour 
failure rates. The average failure rate based on the less than an hour PSA/IPE data is 1.1E-2 
per hour. The greater-than-one-hour average failure rate based on the PSA/IPE data is 2.3E-
3 per hour. 
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The plant-specific estimates of failure to run probability were calculated for the respective 
mission times postulated in the PSA/IPE. The mission times postulated in PSA/IPE accidents 
were 6, 8, and 24 hours. Susquehanna assumed a 72-hour mission time, but details on how 
this was factored into the EDG failure probability estimate are not available. The RG-1.108 
values for Susquehanna are calculated for a 24 hour mission time. Even though the IPE stated 
a 72-hour mission time, RG-1.108 data is restricted to less than a 24-hour run time. 
Extrapolating the FTR probability to 72 hours was not done since the failure data was based 
solely on the cyclic surveillance tests of 24-hour endurance run. The Palo Verde IPE utilized a 
7-hour mission time as their success criteria. The RG-1.108 values for Palo Verde are based 
on an 8-hour mission time. 
In T-book for Nordic countries, one mean failure rate is provided for the diesel generator 
spurious stop. The critical failures included in the spurious stop have been the following: 
leakage in various forms, spurious trip for long start-up time or high voltage due to erroneous 
or incorrectly adjusted relays. The mean failure rate is around 1E-3/h level for Nordic plants. If 
this failure rate was used for scenarios of a longer mission time, the EDG failure probability 
would be quite high. 
It is necessary to look at the whole EDG train boundaries for the prolonged mission time, as 
the root causes must be addressed as a part of the analysis. The boundary of the EDG train 
includes  
 the diesel engine,  
 electrical generator,  
 generator exciter,  
 output breaker,  
 load shedding and sequencing controls,  
 EDG room heating/ventilating subsystems,  
 the exhaust path,  
 lubricating oil,  
 fuel oil subsystem (including all storage tanks permanently connected to the engine 
supply),  
 the starting compressed air subsystem. 
 
The fuel capacity of the day fuel tank and the large external storage tank need to be 
considered.  The large external storage tanks have a capacity for several days of system 
operation. The day tank typically has capacity to operate the engine for 4 to 6 hours (Grant et 
al. 1999). 
 
A more recent study is INL/EXT-14-31133 where a performance evaluation of EDGs using 
Equipment Performance and Information Exchange data from 1998 through 2012 and 
maintenance unavailability performance data using Mitigating Systems Performance Index 
Basis Document data from 2002 through 2012. The failure types studied are failure to start, 
failure to load and run and failure to run >1 hour. The results indicate that the failure rate during 
the first hour is more than three times greater than the failure rate after the first hour. 
2.8 Epistemic uncertainty 
Uncertainties are generally divided into two types: aleatory and epistemic. For the PROSAFE 
project mainly the epistemic uncertainty is of interest, since the aleatory uncertainty (stochastic 
uncertainty) describes the randomness that is the basis of events and phenomena.  
Epistemic uncertainty refers to uncertainties related to a lack of knowledge, information or 
methods, also called “State-of-knowledge uncertainty” (NUREG-1855). This type of uncertainty 
can be identified, valued and reduced and is therefore relevant for all areas of the PROSAFE 
literature study. Three different definitions of epistemic uncertainty are presented in Table 4.  
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Epistemic uncertainty is normally divided into three groups: 
 Parametric uncertainty 
 Model uncertainty 
 Completeness uncertainty 
For the areas of the literature study, parametric uncertainty mainly relates to uncertainties in 
reliability data, parameter values in thermo-hydraulic success criteria calculations and human 
reliability calculations. Model and completeness uncertainties exists more or less in all tasks, 
though with emphasis on model uncertainty. 
The need to address model and/or completeness uncertainties concerning e.g. stable end 
state, success criteria and mission time was identified in (ASAMPSA_E 2015) but also 
recognised to be significantly harder to quantify than parametric uncertainty. Although it was 
stated to require alternative logic models, it was found necessary to include in the PSA. 
Related to the areas of the PROSAFE literature study, the following high level or supporting 
requirements can be found in the ASME/ANS RA-S-2008: 
 HLR-SC-B: The thermal/hydraulic, structural, and other supporting engineering bases 
shall be capable of providing success criteria and event timing sufficient for 
quantification of [core damage frequency] CDF and [large early release frequency] 
LERF, determination of the relative impact of success criteria on SSC and human 
actions, and the impact of uncertainty on this determination.  
 HR-D6: PROVIDE an assessment of the uncertainty in the HEPs in a manner 
consistent with the quantification approach. USE mean values when providing point 
estimates of HEPs. 
 HR-G8: Characterize the uncertainty in the estimates of the HEPs in a manner 
consistent with the quantification approach, and PROVIDE mean values for use in the 
quantification of the PRA results. 
 HLR-QU-E: Uncertainties in the PRA results shall be characterized. Sources of model 
uncertainty and related assumptions shall be identified, and their potential impact on 
the results understood. 
 HLR-LE-F: The quantification results shall be reviewed, and significant contributors to 
LERF, such as plant damage states, containment challenges, and failure modes, shall 
be identified. Sources of model uncertainty and related assumptions shall be identified, 
and their potential impact on the results understood. 
NUREG-1855 gives guidance on how to address the different epistemic uncertainties in PSA 
applications, it does however not give guidance on how to treat uncertainties within specific 
areas, e.g. safe and stable end state or acceptance criteria. Though the presented 
methodology should in large be applicable also for plant PSA. 
A possible approach for evaluating uncertainties in assumptions related to the success criteria 
definition is described in NUREG/CR-7177, where the effect of variations in MELCOR 
modelling assumptions on figures-of-merit for level 1 PSA is investigated and also the choice 
of core damage surrogates. It was found that some particular modelling assumptions can have 
significant impact, e.g. break size and location, number of ruptured steam generator tubes, 
reactor power level at the time of trip, timing of early operator actions, time of battery depletion, 
behaviour of turbine-driven systems after battery depletion; and stochastic failure in the open 
or partially open position of relief valves. 
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NUREG/CR-7177 also presents a MELCOR uncertainty analysis for a loss of feedwater 
scenario and compare the results with a corresponding uncertainty analysis performed with 
MAAP code, without finding any significant differences in terms of the fraction of accident 
simulations predicted to result in core damage.  
Table 4: Definitions for epistemic uncertainty. 
Source Definition 
ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 “the uncertainty attributable to incomplete knowledge about a 
phenomenon that affects our ability to model it. Epistemic 
uncertainty is reflected in ranges of values for parameters, a 
range of viable models, the level of model detail, multiple 
expert interpretations, and statistical confidence. In principle, 
epistemic uncertainty can be reduced by the accumulation of 
additional information.  (Epistemic uncertainty is sometimes 
also called ‘modeling uncertainty.’)” 
Source of model uncertainty: “a source that is related to an 
issue in which there is no consensus approach or model and 
where the choice of approach or model is known to have an 
effect on the PRA model (e.g., introduction of a new basic 
event, changes to basic event probabilities, change in success 
criterion, introduction of a new initiating event).” 
NUREG-1855 “Model uncertainty is related to an issue for which no 
consensus approach or model exists and where the choice of 
approach or model is known to have an effect on the PRA 
model (e.g., introduction of a new basic event, changes to 
basic event probabilities, change in success criterion, and 
introduction of a new initiating event). A model uncertainty 
results from a lack of knowledge of how structures, systems 
and components (SSCs) behave under the conditions arising 
during the development of an accident.” 
NUREG-2122 
 
“Variability in an estimate because of the randomness of the 
data or the lack of knowledge.” 
“Parameter uncertainty is the uncertainty in the values of the 
parameters of a model represented by a probabilistic 
distribution. Examples of parameters that could be uncertain 
include initiating event frequencies, component failure rates 
and probabilities, and human error probabilities that are used 
in the quantification of the accident sequence frequencies.” 
“Completeness uncertainty is caused by the limitations in the 
scope of the model, such as whether all applicable physical 
phenomena have been adequately represented, and all 
accident scenarios that could significantly affect the 
determination of risk have been identified.” 
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3. Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was prepared for the stakeholders of the project. It covers the same areas as 
the literature survey in the previous section. The questions are presented in Appendix. Five 
nuclear power plant companies, two nuclear safety regulators, and one nuclear fuel and waste 
management company answered to the questionnaire. This section presents a summary of 
questionnaire results. The section is divided into subsections according to the areas of the 
questionnaire. 
3.1 Safe, stable state 
The respondents provide different definitions of safe and stable end state (SSES) with 
variations regarding content, areas of applicability (e.g. PSA, deterministic safety analysis) and 
level of detail. Two organizations have no definition that is applied in PSA. 
SSES for PSA level 1. Most definitions of SSES for PSA level 1 agree on requiring successful 
reactor shutdown and secured decay heat removal. Many also require reactor subcriticality 
and water supply for 24 hours, which is the time window mentioned when explicitly included in 
the definitions (i.e., in 50% of the responses).1 One organization also includes in the definition 
of safe state the requirement of a non-pressurized reactor and of a leak-tight containment in 
LOCA scenarios. When SSES definitions for spent fuel are provided they refer to sufficient 
cooling to maintain stable temperature (and subcriticality). Three organizations also mention a 
general definition that “safe state is an operating state that minimizes the risk of a radiological 
accident.” One of the organizations mentions it only in relation to deterministic safety analyses. 
Some organizations specifically define the concepts “controlled”, “safe” and “final safe state”, 
but also here differently. A controlled state requires reactor shutdown (and subcriticality for one 
organization) and decay heat removal. Safe state is achieved when the reactor is also 
depressurized and can be kept in controlled state as long as the safety demands of the event 
remain. From a safe state it is possible to return to normal operation or proceed to the final 
safe state. Final safe state is when the subcritical reactor’s residual heat is removed with a 
good margin and the safety demand caused by the event no longer exists. The reactor can be 
depressurized and the core removed. One organization applies the definition of controlled state 
to the successful end states in PSA instead of the definition of safe state. 
One organization specifies a definition for spent fuel so that “safe state means that operations 
with handling of the fuel are able to end such that the spent fuel is in fuel pools or in another 
position where it can be stored safely with respect to cooling and criticality.” 
SSES for PSA level 2. In broad terms PSA level 2 definitions assume a SSES when a major 
release to the atmosphere has ceased within 24 hours from the event start. The reactor is in 
“controlled state”, which implies core/debris decay heat removal secured, core/debris 
temperatures stable or decreasing, no risk of re-criticality, and no significant volumes of fission 
products being released, and, in addition, any remaining release is minor (the pressure inside 
the containment is low enough if the containment is not leak-tight). Two organizations specify 
the parameters for the size of a small release (e.g., less than 0.1% of volatile / non-volatile 
fission products of the hearth inventory of a 1800 MW type reactor; reactor subcritical with 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) temperature under 100 ºC). Some organizations do not 
necessarily consider the successful end states in PSA level 2 as stable and safe states, but as 
controlled states. 
                                               
1 One organization used to distinguish between safe states (”ok” end states in the PSA event tree) 
recognizing that although a core is kept stable and cooled within the time frame, discharge of primary 
coolant to the atmosphere may still occur and/or core damage might occur later, if additional recovery 
actions to establish long-term cooling are not performed. This distinction is no longer applied. 
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SSES in deterministic analysis. In deterministic analysis the definitions of “stable state” refer 
to an operating mode where the radiological consequences of an accident are under allowed 
values. The situation is under control when the transient is over. More specifically, the 
definitions refer to the following set of physical conditions/parameters: 
 reactor shut down and non-pressurised 
 fuel covered with water 
 no boiling 
 decay heat removal secured (e.g., RPV temperature below 100 ºC) 
 reactivity control established (e.g., effective multiplication factor of less than 0.995) 
 manual cool down 
 shutdown margin < 5% (safe state) 
For events that include severe core damage additional criteria of the SSES are:  
 water-covered core/debris 
 residual heat removal / long term cooling for the core/debris, 
 debris temperatures stable or decreasing 
 no risk of re-criticality 
 no significant volumes of fission products being released.  
The successful transition from a controlled state to a safe state is usually grounded on a 
qualitative analysis, and specific “stable states” are defined for each analysis. 
Half of the organizations did not see needs for improvement concerning the definition of safe, 
stable state. One organization stated that more exact definition would increase realism, but it 
is a matter prioritization. For regulators, it would be easier to interpret results if all utilities used 
the same definitions. One organization stated that “there is some ambiguity how the definitions 
for safe state versus controlled state are used. It is also somewhat unclear how the definitions 
should be applied for other operational states than at-power and for non-reactor nuclear 
facilities.” 
3.2 Success criteria 
All organizations stated that a more realistic consideration and modelling of time related 
dependencies of success criteria could in general be beneficial for the PSA, especially for long 
time windows but also within the normal 24 hours mission time, and it could improve the use 
of PSA applications and decision making based on PSA input. 
Success criteria is in general developed based on a conservative approach, though several 
organizations stated that they aim for a best estimate approach. The main concern with regard 
to long time windows was how to take into account that success criteria may change over time. 
 
The deterministic acceptance criteria used in developing success criteria for the different safety 
functions are very similar among the different organizations (e.g. maximum fuel cladding 
temperature < 1204 °C), except for one organization that applies a criteria of max 1000 °C for 
10 min in a core node during the time course studied. Concerning spent fuel pool some 
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organizations only applied fuel covered in water as acceptance criteria, while others also 
considered avoidance of boiling. 
 
Failures of system functions are either assumed to occur immediately after initiating event or 
divided into a few steps related to battery capacity times (mainly considered for electrical 
SSCs). This is either way conservative, and with increased mission times the conservatism will 
also increase (relatively). Change of success criteria over time was only considered by two 
different organisations for one case each. 
 
The computer codes used for calculating success criteria were considered realistic for long 
time windows by two organisations, though the codes had not been verified for long time 
windows. 
 
Most organizations analysed other end states than core damage, mainly boiling of spent fuel 
pool or condensation pool, but partial core damage was only analysed by one organization 
and in that case for level 2 (limited core melt).  
 
3.3 Mission times 
Most organizations use mission time of 24 hours in level 1 PSA. One organization uses 20 
hours. In level 2 PSA, the used mission times vary from 24 hours to 48 hours (including also 
some mission times between those values). One organization performs level 2 analysis 24 
hours from the onset of the release, which varies. Longer mission times are considered for 
shutdown states and spent fuel pool analyses. Some organizations use shorter mission times 
in loss of offsite power scenarios and for batteries. One organization models some actions 
outside the defined time windows. A special case is an interim storage facility for spent fuel, 
for which mission time of 720 hours is used. 
If safe, stable state is not reached at an analysis end point, some organizations extend the 
mission time and some do not. 
Some organizations identified some possibilities to change mission times. Longer mission 
times could be used for seismic events. Shorter mission times could be used for diesel 
generators, because loss of offsite power can be shorter than 24 hours, and for some 
supporting systems, such as ventilation systems. 
Challenges related to mission times include: 
 Estimation of failure probabilities in long time window scenarios (see Sections 3.4, 3.5 
and 3.7) 
 Changing success criteria 
 Modelling different mission times increases the model complexity and the number of 
basic events 
 Some components, such as motor operated valves, need to be actuated several times 
during the mission time 
 Possible measures that can be taken after a long time period may not be possible to 
analyse with credibility 
 How to deal with extremely long mission times 
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3.4 Recoveries and repairs 
Most organizations model some recovery actions. The recoveries that are modelled are 
typically selected based on their importance for the results and available time. Most 
organizations did not specify which recoveries are modelled. Recoveries of core cooling and 
pressure relief in level 2 PSA are examples that were mentioned. 
Repairs are modelled typically only in long mission time scenarios, such as level 2 PSA and 
spent fuel pool analyses. 
Recoveries and repairs are modelled in PSA either as separate basic events or they are 
included in the probabilities of basic events representing execution errors. One organization 
specifies that they have a fault tree dedicated for repair events, which appears as an event 
tree layer. 
Dependencies between recovery and repair actions and other human actions are generally not 
taken into account. One organization assumes that recovery/repair is either completely 
dependent of the related human action or independent. However, if a recovery failure is 
included in an execution failure, the available time after the execution failure is analysed. 
Errors of commission are not considered in any of the modelled recovery actions. 
To estimate recovery and repair probabilities, HRA methods, plant data and expert judgements 
are used. HRA methods that are used include Enhanced Bayesian THERP (Holmberg 2019) 
and modified accident sequence evaluation program (ASEP) HRA procedure (NUREG/CR-
4772). 
Estimation of recovery and repair probabilities is considered a challenge in long time window 
scenarios. Their modelling also increases model complexity. Modelling of dependencies 
between recoveries and repairs and other human actions could make the analysis more 
realistic. Examples of actions that could be modelled in the future include repair of diesel 
generators, and events related to residual heat removal, water supply and power supply. 
3.5 HRA methods 
The HRA methods used are SPAR-H (NUREG/CR-6883), THERP (NUREG/CR-1278), 
Enhanced Bayesian THERP (Holmberg 2019) and ASEP-HRA (NUREG/CR-4772). Some 
organizations use a combination of two or more of these methods and some organizations use 
a modified version of the method. 
 
Some organizations only consider the diagnosis part for most actions inside the main control 
room. One organization states that the reason for this is that the failure of execution is 
considered to be negligible compared to the diagnosis part. One organization assumes that 
simple and short executions (regardless of location) can be included in the diagnosis part. 
Sometimes the diagnosis and execution parts are modelled as one common basic event, and 
sometimes it is split up into two separate basic events. Practices of taking recovery into 
account vary: some organizations take it into account in both diagnosis and execution parts, 
some do not at all. 
 
In general, no specific modelling is used for human actions with long time windows, but the 
available time is taken into account as one of the PSFs in most HRA methods. Also, in some 
organizations expert judgements and modified or extrapolated values from the ASEP-method 
are used. One organization noted that they do not think that enough credit is given for very 
long time windows with the method that they are using (SPAR-H). Another organization 
comments that they see the need for guidance on how to estimate the effect of the available 
time on the human error probability. 
  
RESEARCH REPORT VTT-R-00883-19 
30 (42) 
 
 
 
 
Some organizations do not use a lower limit for the failure probability and one of them also 
notes that this assumption is motivated by their PSA study. Other organizations use 1E-4 as a 
lower limit and one organization sets the limit to 1E-6. 
 
Most organizations do take concurrent and competing activities into consideration when the 
HEP is calculated, but some do not. 
 
All organizations that responded to the question “Are any human actions with long time window 
modelled” do include such human actions in their PSA. Examples of such actions are actions 
that are required late in level 1 PSA, actions in PSA level 2 or actions/repairs related to spent 
fuel pools. For fuel pools the available time for some of the modelled actions are in the scale 
of several days or weeks. 
 
Most organizations intend to consider different crews and shift changes. Sometimes this is 
included when evaluating the PSFs and sometimes a qualitative assessment is made based 
upon expert judgements. 
 
The main area for development that is identified is how to credit the long available time for 
manual actions and what other factors to take into account. Some organizations indicate that 
the used methods do not completely cover these manual actions with long available time in a 
satisfactory manner. 
3.6 Methods to model time-dependencies 
Different time windows for the return of offsite power are modelled in several PSAs. One 
organization models different diesel generator failure times with separate basic events. One 
organization considers the order of cable failures in fire PSA, because the impact depends on 
the order, but implements different scenarios simply with individual basic events in the PSA 
model. 
Current PSA methods are generally considered sufficient to produce the required results. 
Some organizations however do not consider current methods sufficient to model various time-
dependencies. One organization mentioned that challenging time-dependent scenarios do not 
play an important role in overall results. 
Dynamic methods have not been used in PSA analyses. Reasons include lack of tool support 
and amount of effort needed. 
Needs to model of time-dependencies include 
 Modelling of dynamic success criteria 
 Modelling of failure times in common cause failures (it is conservative to assume that 
all occur at the same time) 
 Passing timing information from level 1 to level 2 
 Modelling of core reflooding in critical time window for hydrogen production 
 Modelling of fast and slow impacts of fires (some safety features may be available early 
in the scenario, but fail later due to fire) 
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3.7 Reliability data 
Most organizations have not considered increasing or decreasing failure rates during an 
accident. Some organizations have modelled different failure rates for diesel generators 
depending on the mission time. Diesel generators have in those cases been modelled with a 
higher failure rate for short mission times, i.e. the failure rate for diesel generators decreases 
for longer time windows. In the study presented in INL/EXT-14-31133, it is shown that the 
failure rate for diesel generators decrease with operating time. 
One organization notes that modelling long mission times is a challenge since it makes failures 
almost inevitable, even if this is not the experience of the operator. There is a perceived 
discrepancy between reality and PSA in this issue. 
Some organizations comment that there is a need to identify component groups and failure 
modes for which non-constant failure rates should be used. One suggestion is that it should 
be evaluated if such data could be presented in the T-book.  
3.8 Epistemic uncertainty 
There were rather few answers to the questions covering uncertainty even though it is a 
recognised area of concern. 
A few organizations stated that uncertainties concerning definition of safe and stable end state, 
success criteria, mission time and reliability data were small within 24h, but also that a 
conservative approach had been used. One organization stated that mission times much 
longer than 24h used in their analyses are used due to requirements and not related to realistic 
time to reach a safe and stable end state, and hence not an epistemic uncertainty.  
Large uncertainties were said to be found mainly concerning scope of HRA for long term 
scenarios with associated failure probabilities, and reliability data for active equipment with 
mission times longer than 24 hours. Also, the choice of recovery actions to include, and hence 
also the number of recovery actions, in the analyses was identified to increase uncertainty.  
3.9 Analysis cases to study within the project 
Spent fuel pool accident scenarios were proposed by several organizations. Two organizations 
stated that HRA should play an important role in the analysis. Long term loss of offsite power 
and external hazard impacting sea water intake were also mentioned. One organization 
proposed that a normal accident scenario (e.g. loss of coolant accident or transient) with 
mission time of 24 hours would be modelled more realistically taking into account dynamic 
success criteria and repairs. The same organization also proposed analysis of a scenario with 
extended mission time considering reaching the safe, stable state. 
4. Conclusions 
This report presents the results of a state of the art review on long time windows in PSA and 
important related topics. The review consists of a literature survey and a questionnaire for the 
stakeholders of the PROSAFE project. The topics covered in this report are: safe, stable state; 
success criteria; mission times; recoveries and repairs; HRA methods; risk and reliability 
analysis methods; reliability data; and epistemic uncertainty. The literature related to long time 
windows appears to be very limited, because PSA is typically limited to the mission time of 24 
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hours. Scenarios with long mission times are generally recognised as a challenging topic that 
should be studied more. 
Ideally, successful PSA sequences should lead to a safe, stable end state. Therefore, the 
definition of the safe, stable state can affect success criteria and mission times. However, in 
practise, that does not seem to be usually the case. Success criteria analyses focus typically 
on avoiding core damage within fixed time window rather than reaching safe, stable state. 
Different safe (stable) state definitions found from the literature and specified by the 
stakeholders of the PROSAFE project vary significantly, and there does not seem to be 
common way to define successful PSA end states. Some also apply the concept of a controlled 
state in PSA instead of safe state. 
Success criteria are in general calculated, and applied, in the PSAs with a conservative 
approach, i.e. by using conservative acceptance criteria while not addressing partial core 
damage, and assuming time independent success criteria during the accident sequence. This 
agrees with state-of-practice in the international PSA community, though several literature 
sources identify the need for consideration of time dependencies, both within 24 hours mission 
time and beyond. The collected opinion from the questionnaire is that the PSA will benefit from 
an advance in methodologies in order to reach a more realistic consideration and modelling of 
time related dependencies of success criteria.  
In level 1 PSA, mission time of 24 hours is usually applied for most safety functions and 
components. In level 2 PSA, the mission time is typically 24 hours or 48 hours, but in some 
cases, even 72 hours has been applied. In spent fuel pool analyses, longer mission times may 
also be used, e.g. 72 hours. It is usually not accurately analysed how long it takes to bring the 
plant to a safe, stable state. Extending the mission time is however generally recommended if 
plant conditions are not stable at the end of normal mission time. Modelling of different mission 
times is considered challenging because it increases the model complexity and the number of 
basic events. 
Some recovery actions are usually modelled in PSA, e.g. for offsite power, emergency diesel 
generators and emergency core cooling. Repairs are usually not modelled in PSA, except 
when long mission times are modelled. Probabilities of recoveries and repairs are estimated 
based on HRA methods, plant data or expert judgements depending on the case. 
Dependencies between recoveries, repairs and other human actions are usually not taken into 
account. Modelling of recoveries and repairs is considered a challenge because it significantly 
increases the model complexity. 
Category C HFEs with long time window usually exist in PSA. Examples are human actions 
that are required late in level 1 PSA, actions in PSA level 2 or actions/repairs related to spent 
fuel pools. Their available time windows are different, with a range from a few hours to a few  
days (or even a few weeks for spent fuel pool). TRC from THERP/ASEP (or a modified curve, 
or combined with a low cut off value) is still commonly used to derive the diagnosis HEPs of 
these HFEs. SPAR-H uses the PSF available time as one of the eight PSFs and the maximum 
multiplier for available time PSF is 0.01. In general when the available time is long, the HEPs 
will reach the applicable boundary of the HRA methods and there is no further guidance 
available to consider the effects of the extra time and the related issues e.g. shift change, 
fatigue, coordination and communication, etc. Thus there is a clear need of better guidance on 
how to estimate the effect of the long available times on the HEPs. 
 
A large number of references on dynamic PSA methods can be found from the literature. Such 
methods could potentially make PSA more realistic. However, according to the questionnaire 
answers, current PSA methods, event trees and fault trees, are considered sufficient to 
produce the required results. Some time-dependencies, like dynamic success criteria, have 
however been considered challenging to analyse using the current methods, and there is need 
to study suitable approaches for modelling such time-dependencies. 
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It has been shown in a few different studies that failure rates of some components are not 
constant over time. Time-dependencies in reliability data are often not considered in PSA. It is 
a challenge especially when long mission times are modelled as the probability of failure is 
perceived as being much too conservative if these kinds of dependencies are not considered. 
Epistemic uncertainty is by the Nordic PSA community in general considered to be an 
important area of improvement within the PSA, which concur with the result of the literature 
survey. The answers to the epistemic uncertainty area of the questionnaire was however few, 
which may be an indication that the area is pre-maturely addressed and that the other areas 
addressed by PROSAFE, and which the uncertainty area concern, must first be further 
elaborated. The literature study also shows that there are rather few references available on 
the subject and that it is recognized as a difficult area to address. 
The objective of the questionnaire was to map current practice and difficulties within the areas 
of the literature survey and to identify the stakeholders view on the prioritized areas for 
research and development. Based on the results of the questionnaire the following contents 
for the continuation of the PROSAFE 2019 are proposed:  
 Work package 2, Safe and Stable State. 
The answers of the questionnaire show that the stakeholders do not see this as a 
prioritized area, see section 3.1. However, the project can see some challenges in 
performing the activities of work package 3 without addressing the definition of safe 
and stable state, especially for e.g. analysis of spent fuel pool. Based on the above, we 
propose that no new activities in this area are included in the 2019 activities, but that a 
definition of Safe and Stable State is developed within work package 3 in order to 
support the work there, and the area will then be further considered when planning the 
2020 activities of PROSAFE.  
 Work package 3, Methodologies 
The activity is proposed to cover the following areas: 
o Modelling of sequences with long time windows. This will mainly address events 
for the spent fuel pool but also core related events requiring mission times 
longer than 24 hours. 
o HRA methodology for actions with long grace times. 
o Consideration of repair of failed equipment. 
o Time window modelling with respect to credit of repairs, dynamic success 
criteria and failure data. 
o Failure data. The area will be shortly addressed by identification of needed 
development, e.g. prioritized component types. 
 Work package 4, Pilot Studies 
The purpose of the pilot studies is to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed methods 
in WP3. Real case studies can point out significant issues for the method development 
work of WP3. For this purpose the generic model from the DIGREL project (Authen et 
al. 2015) will be used, and complemented with a model for the spent fuel pool. Apart 
from this, the Ringhals 3/4 model of the spent fuel pool may also be used. The Pilot 
studies are carried out in close cooperation with the utilities which are the owners of 
NPP PSAs.  
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Appendix: Questionnaire 
The list of questions included in the questionnaire is presented below. 
Part 1: Safe, stable state 
1.1 How is safe, stable end state defined in your organization in 
a. level 1 PSA (full-power, low power and shutdown)? 
b. level 2 PSA? 
c. deterministic safety analyses? 
d. If safe, stable end state has not been defined for some of the above analyses, can 
you present some ideas on how the safe, stable state could be defined for those? 
e. What is the reasoning behind the safe, stable end state definition? Why such 
plant state is considered safe? 
1.2 Do you have deterministic acceptance criteria on some physical parameters for 
defining the safe, stable state? 
a. If yes, specify the criteria. How were the criteria decided? Are different criteria 
used for different scenarios? 
b. If not, which parameters should/could be considered when developing such 
criteria? If you have suitable limit values (even roughly) in mind, e.g. based on 
your thermo-hydraulic analyses used to determine success criteria for safety 
functions, please specify. Should the criteria depend on the scenario that 
is analysed or not? 
1.3 Can you provide examples on how the safe, stable state definition is applied in 
practice, e.g. in specific accident scenarios? 
1.4 Do you identify any problems in the current definitions of safe, stable states, or needs 
for improvement? 
Part 2: Success criteria 
2.1 Defining success criteria: 
a. What are your main principles for defining success criteria? 
b. Are your success criteria conservative or based on best estimates? 
c. What are your main concerns regarding (long) time windows? 
2.2 What deterministic acceptance criteria / limit values are used in developing success 
criteria for each key safety function of core and containment at: 
a. Power operation? 
b. Low power and shutdown? 
c. Spent fuel pool? 
2.3 Describe if and how you consider time dependencies (mission time) when addressing 
success criteria for system functions in your PSA, e.g.: 
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a. What kind of assumptions are made about failure times of other systems failing in 
the same scenario? Do you e.g. assume failures at the earliest possible time, 
when failures could occur at any time point during e.g. 24 hours? 
b. Are there cases where initial success criterion could change during the accident, 
e.g. from 2-out-of-4 to 1-out-of-4, to account for increased margins to acceptance 
criteria later in the sequence? Have such cases been modeled or could there be 
need to model such scenarios? 
2.4 Are success criteria for support systems  
a. calculated using supporting computer codes? If not, what are they based on? 
b. coherent with time dependencies considered for success criteria of the supported 
front line systems, or conservatively assigned based on “worst-case”? 
2.5 Concerning the computer codes you use for calculating success criteria: 
a. Have they been qualified/verified for long time windows? 
b. Do you think that the results for long time windows are (or would be) realistic? 
2.6 Are partial core damage, damaged/uncovered fuel in spent fuel pool (criticality) or 
other end states than core damage analyzed? 
a. If yes, explain when and how success criteria are developed. 
b. If no, explain why. 
2.7 Do you think a more realistic consideration/modelling of time dependencies of 
success criteria would be beneficial for the PSA? 
a. If no, please state why. 
b. If yes, please state in which areas. 
Part 3: Mission times 
3.1 Defining mission times: 
a. What are your main principles for defining mission times? 
b. Do you extend the mission time when/if a safe and stable end state is not reached 
within the pre-defined mission time? 
3.2 Do you apply other mission times than 24 hours? 
a. In which scenarios? 
b. In which scenarios could it be necessary to consider longer or shorter mission 
times? 
c. Have you modelled different mission times for the same safety 
function/system/component in different accident scenarios? If yes, how? 
3.3 Challenges related to mission times: 
a. What kind of challenges do you experience related to determination of the mission 
times? 
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b. What kind of practical challenges do you experience related to modelling of 
different mission times, e.g. related to PSA software or model complexity? 
Part 4: Recoveries and repairs 
4.1 Are there any recovery/repair actions modelled in the plant HRA and PSA? If yes, 
please explain: 
a. How the recovery/repair actions are identified? What criteria need to be fulfilled in 
order to consider recovery/repair actions and under which circumstances? 
b. How the actions are quantified, including the method, the considered factors, 
etc.? 
c. How the dependencies are considered between the recovery/repair action and 
the related human actions in the PSA? 
d. Are errors of commission considered in recovery/repair actions? 
e. How are the recoveries/repairs and their effects modelled in PSA models? 
4.2 Are there any challenges that have prevented you from crediting some recovery or 
repair actions? 
4.3 Which recovery and repair actions could be credited in your PSA model, particularly if 
longer mission times would be used? 
Part 5: HRA methods 
5.1 In general terms describe the Type C (post-initiator) HRA methodology in your plant 
PSA (level 1 & 2, internal and external event), including: 
a. Which HRA method(s) is used? Have you modified the method(s) for 
your purposes? 
b. Are “Diagnosis” and “Execution (post-diagnosis)” always addressed separately in 
the quantification? If no, please explain why. If yes, is recovery in 
general considered for both “Diagnosis” and “Execution (post-diagnosis)”? 
c. If applicable, also describe briefly how the time effects are considered in HRA. 
5.2 Please provide information on how the human actions with expansive available time 
(available time is much longer than the nominal time required) are currently 
quantified, e.g.: 
a. How the expansive time is considered in the diagnosis and execution? 
b. If limiting human error probability value is defined and applied? 
c. If the impact of concurrent and competing activities is considered? 
d. The impact of other performance shaping factors on the time available. 
e. If staff (MCR, TSC, ERO) operates differently as opposed to short available 
time scenarios? 
5.3 Are any human actions with long time window modelled, especially in the plant level 2 
PSA? 
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a. If yes, please provide some example human actions and explain how this has 
been considered in the quantification. 
b. If no, please explain why there are no such human actions. 
5.4 Are there any scenarios in the PSA model (level 1 and level 2) where different crews 
are considered in connection with a long time window? If yes, can you describe: 
a. e.g. personnel outside main control room, technical support organization, crisis 
management organization, firefighters, etc. 
b. How this is quantified/taken into account? 
c. Have you considered changes of shifts (one shift replacing another)? If yes, how 
have you taken these into account in the model? 
Part 6: Methods to model time-dependencies 
6.1 Modelling timings: 
a. Have different possible timings of any events, e.g. failure times, been modelled in 
level 1 or in level 2? If yes, provide examples and information on how the 
modelling has been done. 
b. Could there be need to model timings, e.g. failure times, more in level 1 or in level 
2? If yes, please provide examples. 
c. Do you consider current methods sufficient for modelling timings? If there are 
problems, what are the main problems? 
6.2 Dynamic methods: 
a. Have you used any dynamic methods in your analyses concerning e.g. 
recoveries, repairs, failure times or long time windows? 
b. If you have used dynamic methods, which ones have you used and what is your 
experience about those (benefits, downsides, etc.)? 
c. If you have not used dynamic methods, why not (no regulatory requirement, no 
important scenarios where they would be needed, difficult to understand, tedious 
to model, lack of tool support)? 
d. Do you have suggestions on what methods should be studied to model time 
aspects better in PSA? 
Part 7: Reliability data 
7.1 In reality, failure rates of components may increase or decrease during an accident. 
a. Have you identified such cases? Do you have evidence for that in operational 
experience? 
b. What failure data have you used in this context? 
c. Do you consider time-dependent failure rates in PSA? How? 
d. Do you consider time-dependent failure rates an important issue in long mission 
time scenarios? 
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e. Do you know failure data references for long mission time scenarios? 
Part 8: Epistemic uncertainty 
8.1 How do you consider completeness and model uncertainty with regard to: 
a. Definition of safe, stable end state? 
b. Developed success criteria? 
c. Assumed mission times? 
d. HRA methods and probabilities? 
e. Recoveries? 
f. Reliability data? 
g. Quantification methods? 
8.2 What is your area of biggest concern regarding epistemic uncertainty? 
Part 9: Analysis cases 
9.1 Can you specify example scenarios that you think should be analysed in the 
PROSAFE project? 
